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I have 15 minutes or so, not very much, so I need to keep it short and
to the point. Figure no more than 2250 words, or 2400 at most. Right
now: about 2950. Need to cut about 500.
Antiquity, for Renaissance humanists, was the measure of all things.
Whether they looked back at ancient Rome with hope or despair, whether
they feared that they could never rival the achievements of Scipio, Cicero,
and Virgil, or strove mightily to do so, humanists took antiquity as a canon,
as the rule against which achievement should be measured.1 Precisely this
separated them from their scholastic opponents, who questioned the value of
reading pagan poets, with their immoral lies, and pagan philosophers, whose
notion of the highest good simply displayed the limits of reason in an age of
revelation.2 Faced with such arguments, humanists took up their pens to
defend the classics, but only after shaking their heads and muttering
“barbarians!”—or as we might say, “philistines!”
2Erasmus’s choice of terms in his early defense of classical learning,
the Antibarbari, is telling. His response to critics of the studia humanitatis
is, in the first instance, an esthetic response, a matter of taste. But taste and
morals were two sides of the same coin for Erasmus and other Renaissance
theologians and philosophers. Esthetics would not initiate divorce
proceedings against ethics until the eighteenth century, and their separation
is still not complete today. Both Erasmus and his opponents saw the
question of the literary and educational value of the pagan classics as
intimately bound up with questions of sound—that is, Christian—ethics.
Though his work occasionally provided an opening for an ethically neutral
treatment of the classics, Erasmus consistently rejected this approach. For
him, pagan literature was valuable insofar as it promoted a Christian ethic.
Precisely because Erasmus and his contemporaries treated questions
of taste in ethical terms, and vice-versa, their attacks on and defenses of
pagan literature are shot through with contradictions, from the modern point
of view at least. In the next few minutes I wish to outline Erasmus’s creative
response to the tension between his idealization of antiquity and his
Christian commitments. This study is part of a larger work in progress on the
changing relationships between antiquity, morals, and taste from the
Renaissance to the Enlightenment, and its place within my larger project is
perhaps the only justification for speaking today on Erasmus, whose works
many of you know far better than I. My analysis is based chiefly, though not
exclusively, on two early works, the Antibarbari and the Enchiridion militis
3christiani, to which Erasmus returned later in life; they reflect the
contradictory poles around which his view of antiquity revolved.
I will begin with Erasmus’s praise of antiquity and its implicit moral
valuation of ancient pagans. I will then turn to the problems Erasmus saw in
antiquity, both in the inadequacy of pagan morals and the implicit paganism
of sixteenth-century Ciceronianism. Finally, I will consider the unstable
resolution that Erasmus achieved.
In the Adagiorum chiliades, the work that first gained him fame, Erasmus
instantiated his belief that antiquity was a canonical measure of
achievement.3 Even the lowly proverb, “a saying in popular use, remarkable
for some shrewd and novel turn,” Erasmus claimed, “must be recommended
by its antiquity and erudition alike, for that is what I call shrewd.”4 Such
stylistic flair was natural to the ancient writers, both Latin and Greek, whose
works served as the basis for the literary education Erasmus sketched in On
the method of study.5 In that work, the authors he recommended as models of
style were all pagans.
In some places, Erasmus suggested that stylistic guidance was all that
pagan authors should provide. In the Antibarbari, Erasmus’s mouthpiece
Jacob Batt argues that if literature is to be rejected because it was discovered
by pagans, Christians must also reject carpentry, metalworking, painting,
agriculture, and other useful arts.6 In both the Antibarbari and the
Enchiridion, Erasmus condemned scholastic theologians who misunderstood
4that classical letters had instrumental value. Those who accused students of
secular literature of “walking in the flesh,” or who cite the apostle Paul’s
dictum that “knowledge puffs up, charity builds” against humanists, were
guilty of twisting Paul’s words to defend their own ignorance.7 The apostles’
simplicity is exemplary, but it does not exclude the study of pagan literature.
The Christian “should reflect the moral virtues of the apostles and at the
same time the learning of Jerome. What happens is that everyone imitates
the roughness of the apostles and no one imitates their lives.”8 Classical
learning provides a polished finish to Christian morals.
But learning was much more, as Erasmus insisted repeatedly.
“Learning is something that engages the entire person,” he claimed, and thus
“a proper and conscientious instruction is the well-spring of all moral
goodness.”9 The study of literature—that is, of pagan authors—contributes
to forming a good mind by teaching not only style but also virtue and vice,
leading Erasmus to argue—in spite of all evidence—that an educated man
must ipso facto abhor vice more than an ignoramus.10 In other words,
learning involves moral philosophy. In his stricter account in the
Enchiridion, Erasmus held that learning is ethically neutral, but properly
used it can assist progress toward the supreme goal of salvation.11
Erasmus’s position required that he refute scholastic arguments that
pagan books were necessarily immoral. In the first instance, Erasmus noted
that many Christians whose books are approved are probably in Hell; even
worse, theologians read writers like Origen who were declared heretical.12
5Hence one can have no a priori reason not to read pagans. Furthermore, no
less an authority than Augustine distinguished licit from illicit pagan
learning, condemning superstitions but explicitly permitting the liberal arts.
“Listen to what this justest of men says  . . .: ‘If those who are called
philosophers, especially the Platonists, have chanced to say things that are
true, and in agreement with our faith, far from fearing these utterances we
should claim them for our own, taking them over from their unlawful
possessors.’”13 Erasmus, like Petrarch in the Secretum, took Augustine’s
words out of context and twisted them to suit his own purposes—precisely
what he had accused his opponents of doing with Paul.14 Nonetheless, he
took Augustine’s words as a warrant for his own project, a defense of
eloquence and of allegorical reading of pagan poets.
Even Gratian and other scholastic authorities, Erasmus noted with
glee, approved the liberal arts; Gratian’s Decretals listed arguments against
them but concluded that they were permissible; those who concluded
otherwise either misread Gratian or overlooked his use of dialectical method
in their partisan zeal. Other scholastic writers praised literature, condemning
only its misuse. Erasmus’s conclusion is that “none of the liberal disciplines
is Christian, because they neither treat of Christ nor were invented by
Christians; but they all concern Christ.”15
If pagan texts were useful instruments for Christians, however, they were
dangerous and had to be handled with respect. The reader must not “imbibe
6pagan morals along with pagan writings,” and he should avoid the obscene
poets unless he knows in advance that he will abhor their vice and thereby
strengthen his virtue.16 The poets must be read allegorically, and in the case
of potentially threatening texts, such as Virgil’s homoerotic second Eclogue,
the allegory must be carefully considered to emphasize a moral point, not to
promote vice. Done properly, allegorical exegesis focuses the reader on lofty
thoughts.17
Even pagan virtues sometimes smacked of vice. Love of family is
natural, and even pagans possess this virtue “by natural instinct.” But faced
with a choice between serving kin and serving God, the spiritual man must
not hesitate to choose God; otherwise, the soul “harkens to the harlot, that is,
the flesh, [and] becomes one with the body.”18 Pagan magnanimity, one of
Cicero’s four cardinal virtues, appeared to Erasmus as tantamount to the
deadly sin of pride; even the pagans Cato and Brutus charged Cicero with
boasting.19
Pagan poets could, Erasmus insisted, speak Christian truth. Even the
lowly Disticha Catonis, an eclectic, late antique collection of moralizing
aphorisms, taught great theology when it claimed, “If God is spirit, as poets
say / With purest mind must he be worshipped.”20 We might question
Erasmus’s claim that this thought was worthy of Augustine or Origen. More
significantly, though, Erasmus insisted that pagan wisdom was worthy of a
Christian’s attention only when it squared with Christian doctrine. As
Erasmus claimed in the Enchiridion,
7The beginning of this wisdom is to know thyself, a saying that
antiquity believed to have come down from heaven and that found
such acceptance with the great authors that they considered it to be the
epitome of all wisdom. But this teaching would have little authority
for us if it did not accord with the Scriptures.21
Without Christian doctrine—drawn from the pure fount of the Gospels, not
the crabbed Summae of the schoolmen—pagan wisdom was pure poison.
Erasmus had seen the effects of that poison during his trip to Italy and
in the nefarious effects of Italian Ciceronianism on his fellow Burgundian,
Christophe de Longueil. In 1528, he offered his Dialogus Ciceronianus as an
antidote. Modern critics have seen the Ciceronian controversy as a conflict
between objective scholarship, which, in Michel Jeanneret’s words, aims to
stabilize the text and effaced the reader, and the creative appropriation of the
ancients (for example, by Montaigne), which is engaged, dialogic, and
creative, but not objective.22 There is certainly an element of truth in this
characterization, but it fails to capture the tension over the proper use of
antiquity in Erasmus’s thought. More telling is the suggestion made by
Erasmus himself through the character of Willem Conrad, burgomaster of
Bergen-op-Zoom, in the Antibarbari. Conrad suggested to the other
characters that opponents of the new learning may have “had some
perception that there is an incompatibility between pure religion and
consummate learning. Piety rests on faith, erudition uses arguments for
investigation, and calls the facts into question.”23 Erasmus prefigures here
8the skepticism of the seventeenth century, but in the Antibarbari as it has
survived he did not take up the challenge posed in those lines.
Instead, Erasmus insisted that the Italians and their allies, under the
cover of Cicero’s name, are trying “to make us pagans instead of
Christians.”24 To be sure, Cicero should be in everyone’s hands as the chief
model for eloquence.25 But students should “combine his supreme powers of
expression with the faith of Christ.”26 The true Ciceronian, in Erasmus’s
sense, followed the spirit of Cicero, plucking flowers of eloquence from all
the best writers and distilling them into pure nectar; the antlike Italian
Ciceronian, caricatured in Erasmus’s character Nosoponus with his three
Ciceronian lexica, only piled together what he had laboriously gathered.27
And times had changed. The ants’ labors were more than useless: they
were pernicious. Christians should begin their letters like Christians, not like
pagans, just as painters and scuptors should represent Christ and the saints
like men of their times, not ancient pagans.28 The rhetorical principle of
decorum, not to mention simple Christian decency, required as much. In a
Christian age, it was “sheer paganism” to use pagan words to disguise
Christian ideas. “The fact is,” Erasmus’s mouthpiece Bulephorus insists,
we’re  Christians only in name. Our bodies may have been dipped in
the holy water, but our minds are unbaptized. The sign of the cross
may have been put on our brows, but the cross itself is repudiated by
the mind within. We have Jesus on our lips, but it’s Jupiter Optimus
Maximus and Romulus that we have in our hearts.29
9The Italian passion for collecting antiquities was equally culpable; indeed, it
was a form of idolatry.
How we enthuse over some inscription, some epitaph discovered on a
crumbling stone: “To my splendid wife Lucia who perished before her
time. Set up by Marcellus and dedicated to the spirits of the dead.
Alas, why do I yet live?” This sort of thing is usually full of foolish
pagan ideas, and dreadful grammar mistakes besides; yet we love it,
we adore and practically worship its antiquity.30
Of course, Erasmus wielded the trope of hyperbole to good effect in this
passage, and we must keep in mind that the Roman god Terminus—with an
appropriately Christian gloss—was Erasmus’s own emblem. Nonetheless, in
the colloquium Convivium religiosum Erasmus emphasized that Eusebius,
the host, adorned his garden with images of St. Peter and Christ, not herms
and termini.31
Left unchecked, the study of antiquity could lead to paganism. So Erasmus
concluded in the Ciceronianus. One could see this conclusion as the bitter
fruit of Erasmus’s last decade, were it not for the earlier echoes in the
Enchiridion and even the Antibarbari, Erasmus’s youthful defense of the
classics. Still, Erasmus insisted throughout his life that the study of pagan
antiquity was not merely pleasant, but also, as James Tracy has put it, useful
and even necessary—when properly reined in. There are three main areas
where Erasmus put antiquity to Christian use.
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First, pagan literature supplied an idiom. So long as Christian terms
were applied to Christian concepts, and slavish imitation was avoided, pagan
writers could teach eloquence. By the time Erasmus died, few doubted this
principle; classical Latin had triumphed over the medieval idiom.32
Second, antiquity could be exemplary, but only when held within tight
bounds. In his pietistic writings, Erasmus used examples in two main ways.
On the one hand, examples of pagan virtue underscored most Christians’
depravity. After all, “most Christians are superstitious rather than pious, and
except for the name of Christ differ hardly at all from superstitious
pagans.”33 Pagans, for instance, thought that baseness was vile per se,
despite having no fear of a just God who would pass judgment, whereas
many Christians behave shamefully despite knowing that divine judgment
was swift and unerring. Pagans offer “a thousand illustrious examples of
every virtue,” compared with ordinary Christians’ vices.34 On the other hand,
ancient proverbs and myths could illustrate Christian virtues. Proteus
embodied the violent shifts that characterize human passions, while Aeneas
showed the Christian to be steadfast in the face of imagined difficulties.
Erasmus offered the patience of Hercules in his labors as a pagan
counterpart to that of Job.35 But these allegorical exempla were almost
infinitely mutable.36 Erasmus himself knew that proverbs were protean and
could be tailored to any situation; if all else failed, the trope of irony, the
writer’s deus ex machina, would come to his rescue.37
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Third, pagan literature was an honorable, if necessarily preliminary,
preparation for the coming of the Gospel. If John was the vox clamantis in
deserto, Cicero was the vox clamantis in foro. This was true for Erasmus
himself; by the time he finished the Enchiridion in DATE, he insisted that
his study of the pagan classics would prepare him for his Christian mission.38
It was also true in a world-historical sense: “Everything in the pagan world
that was valiantly done, brilliantly said, ingeniously thought, diligently
transmited, had been prepared by Christ for his society. He it was who
supplied the intellect, who added the zest for inquiry, and it was through him
alone that they found what they sought.”39 This was the ultimate justification
of pagan studies: God himself had sent the pagans to prepare his way.
In such wise, Erasmus defanged antiquity. His ancients were not yet the
sardonic critics that Bayle and Voltaire would see in antiquity. Nonetheless,
Erasmus’s writings on the proper use of the ancients reveals an underlying
unease, an unease that makes him at times sound very close to the
“barbarians” he attacked—in every way but one. Erasmus never claimed that
the ancients, even in their least moral moments, wrote barbarously. Their
words may have been good or bad, but they were never ugly. This suggests
to me that Erasmus’s primary response to ancient literature was esthetic; like
his predecessors for more than two centuries, Erasmus loved the classics.
That is, of course, a commonplace. But it is a commonplace that is
worth a moment’s reflection. Erasmus and other humanists loved the classics
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for the pleasure that reading them produced, but they did so in an intellectual
culture that drew no sharp line between beauty and truth. Cicero and
Quintilian had both insisted that “no one can be a good orator without also
being a good man.”40 These Roman theorists reflected the Greek
philosophers’ tendency to join esthetic and ethical reflection. By the
classical age, Greeks had joined “poetic greatness with epistemic value,”
deeming Homer and Hesiod the foundations not only of literature but of
knowledge. Plato joined beauty and morals more systematically. Beauty
stirred the passions, and while in principle the results could be ethically
neutral, in practice the passions most often impelled one to virtue or vice.
Hence Plato’s qualms about poets. Aristotle too saw a close connection,
insisting that a beautiful tragedy was ipso facto moral. Renaissance
philosophers rang changes on these and other ancient comments on beauty
and moral truth without severing their relationship.41
Hence it is not surprising that Erasmus contradicted himself on the
value of antiquity and hedged it about with so many restrictions. Peter Gay’s
summary of Renaissance humanism as “pagan Christianity” is compelling if
one sees it as a compound of a pagan esthetic with Christian morals, in an
age when philosophical language and common usage sanctioned no such
division. In closing, I would like to suggest the direction my work in
progress will be going: the continual engagement with antiquity by Erasmus
and his successors, their struggle to reconcile their commitment to
Christianity with their love of the ancients, would contribute in the end to
13
the separation of ethics and esthetics, at which point the ancients would be
turned out of the realm of morals and relegated to that of taste.42
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Material omitted from final version?
Princes should seek a model in Christ, not pagans  
Princes should seek a model in Christ. “What is
more absurd than that a Christian prince should set
before himself the example of Hannibal, Alexander
the Great, Caesar, or Pompey. While even in these
leaders there are certain virtues he cannot attain,
he will imitate in particular those very qualities
that should be avoided. Examples should not be
drawn from those exploits of Caesar lauded by
historians, but from those which are not at
variance with the teaching of our Lord or are of
such a nature that even though they are not to be
imitated, they may incite us to the pursuit of
virtue.”43
Example of the   Fetial priests [shows limits]  
When Batt begins his speech, he jokingly declares
war on the “barbarian” scholastics by composing a
speech that he attributes to the Fetial priests
[who had the duty of declaring war in Rome]. They
summon out the “Goth” and demand that he either
withdraw or engage in war. When Batt continues,
Erasmus [the character] interrupts, saying, “Take
care you don’t go too fast! You have not completed
all the formalities--you have to kill a pig with a
stone before you rush to arms!” Batt responds that
he would like to, since there are “so many fat
healthy porkers” who live idly off the people.44
M. M. Phillips’s note on the pigs records that Livy 1.24.8
describes the ceremony. This is an interesting example of a classical
use being treated by Erasmus, jokingly if positively. But I don’t get the
sense that it is more than a joke, or that he treated the Roman
practice at all seriously; had he, he would have been repulsed.
43
 Erasmus, Handbook, 100.
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 Erasmus, Antibarbarians, 45-46.
